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Abstract
We develop a model where trade liberalization leads to skill-biased
technological change, which in turn raises the relative return to skilled
labor. When …rms get access to a larger market, the relative pro…tabil-
ity of di¤erent technologies changes so that the relative pro…tability of
the more skill-intensive technology increases. As the composition of
…rms changes to one with predominantely skill-intensive …rms, the rel-
ative demand for skilled labor increases. This way, we establish a link
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1 Introduction
Although the debate about the causes of increased wage inequality in the
industrialized countries has been going on for many years, no clear consen-
sus has as yet emerged. The empirical literature has established a number
of empirical facts, but theorists have not agreed on which theory or theories
that are consistent with these facts. In particular, there is still no consensus
about the extent to which increased foreign competition through trade has
played a role in what seems to be a shift in labor demand towards highly
skilled workers and away from low-skilled workers. A number of studies have
concluded that skilled-biased technological change seems to be the main
driving force behind this development, whereas increased import competi-
tion from low-wage countries appears to have played only a minor role (e.g.
Berman et al., 1994; Desjonqueres et al., 1999). However, it has also been
pointed out that technological change may be driven by factors related to
the increased integration of product markets (see e.g. Burda and Dluhosch,
1999; Haskel and Slaughter, 1999, Falvey and Reed, 2000, Neary, 2001a,
2001b). Yet, the nature of a possible link between technological change and
increased competition through trade remains largely unexplored.
In this paper, we explore such a link by developing a model of imper-
fect competition and intra-industry trade with heterogenous …rms utilizing
technologies that di¤er in their relative use of skilled and unskilled labor.
Two technologies are available: a ”modern” one and a ”traditional” one.
The modern technology is associated with relatively high …xed costs and
relatively low variable costs. Market integration (in the form of reduced
trade costs) leads to an expansion of the market for the individual …rm,
and enhances the pro…tability of modern relative to traditional …rms. As
a consequence, the relative return to skilled labor increases, at the same
time as the skill-intensity in the industry increases; a phenomenon that has
been observed in the empirical literature but that is hard to reconcile with
traditional trade theory and the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model.
In our analysis, the exogenous change that triggers an expansion of trade
and a change in technology is product market integration between similiar
economies. The resulting trade expansion is purely intra-industry in nature.
Thus, unlike most of the literature on trade and income inequality, we fo-
cus on North-North trade rather than North-South trade. By focusing on
market integration between industrialized countries, our model links trade
liberalization to changes in technology in a way that we believe captures an
important driving force behind the recent increase in the relative demand
for skilled labor in these countries.
2
We show that product market integration may give rise to technological
change – attained through a change in the composition of …rms – which
increases the relative demand for skilled labor. However, we also show that
when trade costs fall below a certain threshold, at which all …rms are using
the more skill-intensive technology, and there can thus be no further change
in the composition of …rms, further trade liberalization leads to a fall in
the relative return to skilled labor. The reason is that …rms expand output
by increasing their variable costs, which are relatively intensive in unskilled
labor.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives a brief
review of the related literature. Section 3 presents the basic features of the
model. In section 4, we analyze the relationship between market integration
and technological change, and derive the impact on relative factor returns
and factor intensities of increased economic integration. Finally, in section
5 we o¤er some concluding remarks.
2 Related literature
The empirical literature on the sources of an increased skill-premium in the
industrialized countries is vast. A number of studies have been carried out
using data from di¤erent countries. This literature has produced a number
of empirical facts on which most researchers in the area seem to agree.
These facts include the following: (i) the wage premium to skilled workers
has increased in several industrialized countries; and (ii) the skill-intensity
has increased within practically all industries (see e.g. the survey by Wood,
1998).
Several trade theorists have pointed out that within a Heckscher-Ohlin
framework, the simultaneous increase in the relative price of skilled workers
and skill-intensity is di¢cult to explain. For a given technology, there should
be a negative instead of a positive relation between relative factor price and
factor intensity. This means that even if the relative wage to skilled labor
increases as a consequence of an increased specialization in skill-intensive
production, …rms should substitute the relatively cheaper factor for the rel-
atively dearer one, thus decreasing their skill-intensity.
Technological change, on the other hand, needs to have a sectorial bias to
a¤ect relative factor prices in an unambiguous way: Technological progress
in the skill-intensive sector leads to an increase in the relative return to
skilled labor, whereas skilled-biased technological change in the whole econ-
omy does not necessarily a¤ect relative factor prices. In order for the skill-
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intensity to increase, the bias moreover needs to be of such a magnitude that
it o¤sets the e¤ect of an increased skill premium, which in itself tends to
lower the ratio between skilled and unskilled labor. Hence, as pointed out
by Neary (2001a), the only way skill-biased technological progress in a small
open economy could explain the empirical facts is if it were disproportion-
ately concentrated in the skill-intensive sector at the same time as it were
su¢ciently di¤used throughout the economy to ensure that the skill-ratio
would increase in all sectors.
There are a few theoretical papers that explore a possible link between
trade, technological change and relative returns to skilled and unskilled la-
bor. Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (1999) develop a dynamic general equilib-
rium model in which trade liberalization increases R&D investment. As-
suming that R&D is skill-intensive relative to the production of …nal goods,
trade liberalization also leads to an increase in the relative wage to skilled la-
bor at the same time as there is skill upgrading within each industry. Other
models of endogenous innovation that generate a similar link between trade
liberalization and skilled-biased technological change are Acemoglu (1999)
and Thoenig and Verdier (2000).
Markusen and Venables (1997) focus on the role of foreign direct invest-
ment and multinational …rms in explaining the increase in the skill premium.
They develop a model with two types of …rms; national exporting …rms (with
high variable costs and low …xed costs) and multinational …rms (with low
variable costs and high …xed costs); and identify the circumstances under
which investment liberalization is likely to raise the skill premium in both
the skilled-labor abundant and the unskilled-labor abundant country. In-
vestment liberalization and convergence between countries tend to raise skill
premia because the relative pro…tability of multinational versus national ex-
porting …rms is increased. Trade liberalization, however, tends to lower skill
premia because it a¤ects the relative pro…tability in the opposite direction.
Falvey and Reed (2000) investigate the link between the choice of pro-
duction techniques and relative factor prices in a non-liberalizing developed
country when trade liberalization occurs elsewhere. In their model, the in-
creased skill premium that follows from an increased specialization in skill-
intensive production induces …rms to switch to more unskilled labor intensive
techniques. They make the point that if the cost savings associated with
this switch are larger in the skill-intensive sector than in the unskilled labor
intensive sector, this induced change in technology will tend to exacerbate
the increase in the relative return to skilled labor. However, they acknowl-
edge that the empirical literature does not seem to support a shift towards
more unskilled labor intensive techniques in the developed countries.
4
Neary (2001a) addresses the link between product market competition,
trade and relative wages by developing an oligopoly model in which …rms
invest more aggressively in R&D (which are sunk costs) as a consequence
of trade liberalization (in the form of removing import quotas). Assuming
again that R&D is skill-intensive relative to production activities, this im-
plies that the …rms adopt more skill-intensive production techniques as a
consequence of trade liberalization. Neary (2001b) adopts a similar frame-
work and shows how the threat of competition from foreign …rms encourages
domestic …rms to increase investments, which in turn impacts on the skill
intensity and skill premium. The mechanism focused on by Neary is one
where trade liberalization changes the degree of competition in the market,
which leads …rms to alter their strategic behavior.
Our model shares some features with the model developed by Neary
(2001b). As in Neary’s analysis, we focus on market integration between de-
veloped countries and we assume that markets are characterized by Cournot
competition. With respect to the former similarity, a crucial di¤erence is
that in Neary’s analysis it is the threat of import competition that leads to
technical change, while in ours it is the rise in intra-industry trade that
causes such a change.1 With respect to the latter similarity, a crucial dif-
ference is that we assume free entry and exit and a large number of …rms,
implying that we abstract from the strategic aspects of …rm behavior, which
is the main focus of Neary’s analysis.
From a methodological point of view, our model is similar to Markusen
and Venables (1997). As in their model, …rms are heterogenous with respect
to technology. Furthermore, we adopt a similar equilibrium concept where,
in equilibrium, there are no pro…table opportunities for …rms to enter with
either technology. Thus, as in Markusen and Venables (1997), we allow
for the simultaneous existence of …rms producing with di¤erent technolo-
gies. However, unlike in their analysis, here trade liberalization generates
increased skill premia.
3 The model
We assume that there are two economies, Home (H) and Foreign (F ), pro-
ducing two homogenous goods, X and Y . There are two factors of pro-
1Dinopoulos et al. (1999) also develop a model where a rise in intra-industry generates
an increased skill premium. They assume non-homotheticity in consumption as well as
production, the latter taking the form of skill-biased output expansion. Because trade
liberalization leads to an output expansion at the level of the …rm, it tends to increase the
relative demand for skilled labor.
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duction, skilled and unskilled labor. Labor is mobile between sectors, but
internationally immobile. The good Y is produced with constant returns to
scale, using unskilled labor only, and is sold under perfect competition. We
choose this good as the numeraire. The good X is produced with increasing
returns to scale, using both unskilled and skilled labor.
In the X-sector, there are two types of potential entrants: …rms produc-
ing with traditional technology and …rms producing with modern technology.
The traditional technology is characterized by relatively low …xed costs and
relatively high variable costs, whereas the modern technology is character-
ized by relatively high …xed costs and relatively low variable costs. Fixed
costs consist of costs of skilled labor (S) only, whereas variable costs consist
of costs of unskilled labor (L) only. There is free exit and entry.2 As …rms
enter, they compete as Cournot oligopolists in nationally segmented mar-
kets. The number of …rms in each market, which is endogenously determined
by free entry and exit, is treated as a continuous variable
We assume that countries are completely symmetric, and shall therefore
only present the equations de…ning Home’s tastes and technology, simply
noting that the same equations apply to Foreign. The utility of a represen-
tative consumer is given by a Cobb-Douglas function, yielding the following
demand functions:
DY = (1¡ ¯)E; (1)
DX = ¯E=p. (2)
where E is total income, p is the price of X in terms of Y and ¯ is the
budget share spent on good X. Total income is given by:
E = wLL+wSS; (3)
where L and S are Home’s endowments of unskilled and skilled labor, re-
spectively, while wL and wS are the returns to unskilled and skilled labor,
respectively.
We choose units so that one unit of unskilled labor produces one unit of
output of Y . Furthermore, we assume that the numeraire good Y is freely
2Note that our speci…cation of the model does not allow …rms to choose technology
strategically. The only strategic decision the …rm faces is whether or not to enter the
market (cf. Markusen and Venables, 1997).
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traded, which implies that the return to unskilled labor is equal to one in
both countries (since they are symmetric, they will always produce both
goods):
wL = 1: (4)
This means that the relative return to skilled labor is captured by wS.
The di¤erent technologies available for …rms in the X-sector are de…ned
by the following cost function:
Ck = F kwS + c
kwL(X
k
d +X
k
e ) + twLX
k
e ; k =M;T: (5)
The superscript denotes type of technology so that T stands for the
traditional technology and M stands for the modern technology. F k is the
…xed requirement of skilled labor, ck the requirement of unskilled labor to
produce one unit of output, t the amount of unskilled labor required in
order to ship one unit of output across the border, Xkd the amount of output
supplied to the domestic market, and Xke the amount of output exported
to the foreign market. With respect to the two di¤erent technologies, we
assume that
FM > FT (6)
cM < cT (7)
which implies that technologyM requires higher …xed costs but lower marginal
costs than technology T .
Note that, according to (5), trade costs are incurred in unskilled labor
only. This is a simplifying assumption that does not a¤ect the main results
of the analysis. However, some of the results discussed in subsequent sec-
tions are sensitive to the assumption about factor intensity of trade costs.
Therefore, before concluding, we shall discuss how alternative assumptions
would a¤ect the analysis.
First-order conditions for pro…t maximization in each market imply that
marginal revenue equals marginal cost. Written in complementary slackness
form, we have that
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p(1¡ µkd) · wLck; Xkd ¸ 0; k =M;T (8)
p(1¡ µke) · wL(ck + t); Xke ¸ 0; k =M;T (9)
where µ, the optimal markup, is given by the …rm’s market share divided
by the Marshallian price elasticity of demand in that market. As the price
elasticity is one, given our assumption about demand, the …rm’s markup is
simply its market share. Using that countries are symmetric, this may be
written as:
µkd =
XkdP
k n
k(Xkd +X
k
e )
; k =M;T (10)
µke =
XkeP
k n
k(Xkd +X
k
e )
; k =M;T (11)
where nk is the number of …rms in Home that produce with technology k.
Free entry and exit in the X-sector implies that pro…ts are either zero
(for …rms that operate in the market), or negative (for potential entrants
that do not operate in the market):
p(Xkd +X
k
e ) · F kwS + ckwL(Xkd +Xke ) + twLXke ; nk ¸ 0; k =M;T
(12)
The zero-pro…t condition in (12) is satis…ed with equality if there are …rms in
Home producing with technology k; otherwise it is satis…ed as an inequality
(i.e., nk is the associated complementary slackness variable).
Goods-market clearing in the Y -sector is given by:
DY = Y; (13)
while factor-market clearing is given by the following conditions:
L =
X
k
nk
³
ck(Xkd +X
k
e ) + tX
k
e
´
+ Y (14)
S =
X
k
nkF k (15)
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4 Market integration and relative wages
We now turn to the impact of market integration on technical change, skill
intensity and relative wages. The equilibrium is given by equations (2), (3),
(4), (8), (9), (10), (11), (12), (13), (14) and (15) and the unknown variables
Y , wL; wS , p; µTd , µ
T
e , µ
M
d , µ
M
e , DY , n
T , nM , XTd , X
T
e , X
M
d , X
M
e , and E.
This leaves us with a system of 16 equations and inequalities that solves
simultaneously for 16 unknowns.
We shall …rst explore the e¤ect of market integration on the relative
return to skilled labor when there is no technical change. We show that, in
this case, there will be a negative e¤ect on the relative return to skilled labor
from reductions in trade costs. Then, we investigate how the possibility of
technical change a¤ects the relationship between trade costs and relative
wages. In order to explore the more complicated general equilibrium e¤ects,
we have to rely on numerical simulations.
4.1 Market integration without technical change
We start by analyzing the relationship between wS and t in a situation where
there is only one type of …rm, say, traditional type.3 Using (13) and (15) in
(14) we get:
wS =
¯
1¡ ¯
L
S
¡
¡
cTXT + tXTe
¢
FT (1¡ ¯) : (16)
where XT ´ XTd + XTe . Di¤erentiation of this expression with respect to
trade costs yields:
@wS
@t
= ¡ 1
FT (1¡ ¯)
·
cT
@XT
@t
+ t
@XTe
@t
+XTe
¸
(17)
The derivative @X
T
e
@t is negative since an increase in trade costs will lead to
decreased trade volumes. The deriviate @X
T
@t is also negative because the
increase in domestic sales will be less than the decrease in exports. The
two …rst terms in (17) are thus positive (taking the minus sign outside the
brackets into account) while the last term is negative. Thus, expression (17)
reveals that a change in trade costs has two counteracting e¤ects on the
3The model then becomes similar to a reciprocal dumping model with free entry and
exit (cf. Brander and Krugman, 1983).
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return to skilled labor: On the one hand, the tendency of …rms to produce
smaller quantities when home markets become more protected will have a
positive impact on the relative return to skilled labor.4 On the other hand,
increased costs in terms of unskilled labor for exporting a given quantity
will have a negative impact on the relative return to skilled labor. The
…rst term in (17) shows the e¤ect of changes in the demand for unskilled
labor as …rms’ variable costs are altered in response to output changes. The
second term shows the e¤ect of changes in the demand for unskilled labor
used in exporting the good as …rms respond to changes in trade costs by
reducing exports. Both these e¤ects will contribute to increasing wS as trade
costs increase. The last term shows the e¤ect of changes in the demand for
unskilled labor as the amount of labor required to export a given quantity
changes. This e¤ect pulls in the other direction and contributes to a decrease
in wS as trade costs increase.
Figure 1 shows the relationship between wS and t when we use the
equilibrium conditions of the model 5 We see that wS is increasing in trade
costs, implying that the two …rst terms in (17) dominate over the last term.
We also see that this increase is larger for high levels of t than for low levels of
t. The reason for this is that there is a non-monotonic relationship between
t and the total amount of unskilled labor used to trade goods. While an
increase in trade costs from a low level tends to increase the demand for
unskilled labor stemming from trade costs, an increase from a high level
tends to decrease this demand.6
{FIGURE 1: The return to skilled labor with one type of …rm only}
4Note that here the number of …rms is …xed. Entry of new …rms is not possible
because skilled labor required to cover the …xed costs cannot be drawn from elsewhere
in the economy. The return to skilled labor is determined by the ratio between total
operating pro…ts and the number of skilled workers.
5The equations that are used to …nd the relationship between wS and t are given in
appendix. The graph in Figure 1 is based on the following parametrization: S = L = 10;
F = 1; c = 0:1 and ¯ = 0:5.
6Total trade costs exhibit an inverted u-shaped relationship with trade costs so that
the demand for unskilled labor stemming from trade costs is the highest for intermediate
levels. This implies that for a high level of t, further increases in t will unambiguously lead
to increases in wS . For low levels of t, however, we cannot a priori exclude the possibility
that the increased demand for unskilled labor used to export the good dominates so that
wS decreases with increases in t. Of course, were trade costs to be intensive in skilled
labor instead, the e¤ects would go in the exact opposite directions.
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4.2 Market integration with technical change
The main point made in this paper is that when we allow for entry of …rms
producing with another technology, this positive relationship between wS
and t may turn negative. In other words, with the possibility of entry of
…rms with another technology, reduced trade costs may lead to increased
relative returns to skilled labor. In this section, we shall …rst show that
market integration will make it more attractive for …rms producing with the
modern technology to enter (for a certain range of parameter values). Then,
we shall analyze the e¤ect of an increased share of modern …rms on the
relative demand for skilled and unskilled labor. Finally, we shall explore the
e¤ect on the relative demand for skilled and unskilled labor of a change in
trade costs, taking into account that this change will both a¤ect the relative
pro…tability of modern and traditional …rms and lead to changed trade and
output levels of …rms.
Suppose that we are in an equilibrium where only traditional …rms are
operating. Whether this equilibrium is stable or not depends on whether
a …rm producing with the modern technology …nds it pro…table to enter.
As will be shown in this section, for a certain range of paramenter values,
an equilibrium with only traditional …rms is stable under autarky, but not
under free trade. In such a case, market integration creates incentive for
…rms producing with the modern technology to enter. Their entry will then
trigger technical change and a¤ect relative wages.
In order for a an equilibrium with only traditional …rms to be stable, a
modern …rm that would potentially enter the market has to make negative
pro…ts. This will be the case in autarky if the following condition holds (the
proof is given in appendix):
¡
cMFT + (cT ¡ cM)S¢2 < SFTFM(cT )2
(S ¡ FM) (18)
This condition will hold for a su¢ciently large FM . However, if FM is not
too large, it may still be the case that a modern …rm will …nd it pro…table
to enter an equilibrium with only traditional …rms when goods are traded
freely. In order for a modern …rm to make non-negative pro…ts under free
trade, the following condition has to hold (see appendix):
(cMFT + (cT ¡ cM)2S)2 ¸ 2SF
TFM(cT )2
(S ¡ FM) ; (19)
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which will hold for a su¢ciently low FM . If both (18) and (19) hold, an
equilibrium with only traditional …rms is stable under autarky, but not under
free trade. A necessary condition for both conditions to hold simultanously
is that (cMFT + (cT ¡ cM)2S)2 > 2 ¡cMFT + (cT ¡ cM)S¢2. This implies
that
2(cT ¡ cM)2S2 > (FT cM)2;
which will be true if S is su¢ciently large (again, proof can be found in
appendix).
Choosing parameter values so that these conditions are satis…ed, we get
a situation where, in autarky, an equilibrium with only traditional …rms
is stable, while, in free trade, a stable equilibrium has to include modern
…rms.7 When we move from autarky to complete market integration, the
number of modern …rms will then increase while the number of traditional
…rms will decrease. Because of the non-linearities that the inclusion of trade
costs gives rise to, we cannot rule out the possibility that the composition
of …rms will change in the other direction within certain intervals of trade
costs, but we can be sure that as we move from a trade-prohibitively high
level of trade costs all the way to zero trade costs, the composition of …rms
must change in favor of modern …rms.
The change in the composition of …rms in turn impacts on the relative
demand for skilled and unskilled labor. Since unskilled labor is also used
in the numeraire sector, the relative demand for skilled labor will increase
if the change in the composition of …rms leading to a decrease in the total
demand for unskilled labor from the X-sector. Total demand for unskilled
labor in the X-sector is given by:
LX = n
M(cMXM + tXMe ) + n
T (cTXT + tXTe ) (20)
where XT ´ XTd + XTe and XM ´ XMd + XMe . Di¤erentiating (20) with
respect to nM , using dnT = ¡ ¡FM=FT ¢ dnM , yields:
@LX
@nM
=
1
FT
£
FT (cMXM + tXMe )¡ FM(cTXT + tXTe )
¤
7Either modern …rms will be the only …rm type active or there will be a mixed equi-
librium where both types of …rms co-exist.
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It can be shown (see appendix) that the term in brackets is negative and
@LX
@nM
< 0 if the following condition holds:
cT ¡ cM > t
·
XMe
XM
¡ X
T
e
XT
¸
(21)
The left hand side (21) is positive by assumption. The right hand side is
non-negative (see proof in appendix). Thus, in order for condition (21) to
be satis…ed, the product between trade costs and the di¤erence in export
shares between modern and traditional …rms has to be su¢ciently small.
It is evident that the condition will hold as t approaches zero and as it
approaches the trade-prohibitive level of t (since XMe = X
T
e = 0 at that
level). It is thus only for intermediate levels of t that condition (21) may
not hold. The reason for this is that the higher export propensity of modern
…rms may entail a larger total demand for unskilled labor as unskilled labor
is used to export goods.
If a change in the composition of …rms leads to a decrease in the X-
sector’s demand for unskilled labor (and thereby to an increase in the X-
sector’s skill-intensity), the relative return to skilled labor will increase. This
can be shown by using (1), (4), (14), and (15) to derive the relative return
to skilled labor as a function of the exogenous variables and nM :8
wS =
¯
1¡ ¯
L
S
¡
¡
cTXT + tXTe
¢
FT (1¡ ¯) (22)
+
nM
FT (1¡ ¯)S
£
FM
¡
cTXT + tXTe
¢¡ FT ¡cMXM + tXMe ¢¤ ;
By di¤erentiating wS with respect to nM we get
@wS
@nM
=
1
F T (1¡ ¯)S
£
FM
¡
cTXT + tXTe
¢¡ FT ¡cMXM + tXMe ¢¤ : (23)
We see that the condition for this expression to be positive is the same as the
condition for total demand for unskilled labor to decrease with the number
of modern …rms (i.e. condition (21)).
Our primary interest, however, is in the e¤ect of a reduction in trade
costs, with its subsequent technological change through a change in the
8Note that this expression is derived assuming an equilibrium where both modern and
traditional …rms are operating.
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composition of …rms, on the relative return to skilled labor. In analyzing
this e¤ect, we also have to take into account the fact that a reduction in
trade costs tends to increase produced quantity per …rm and the volume of
trade, leading to increased demand for unskilled labor in production and
trade (as implied by Figure 1). Because of the complexity of the analysis,
we here use numerical simulations. The simulations are carried out using a
solver supplied in the GAMS package which is able to handle complementary
slackness problems directly (see Rutherford, 1995).9
Our model experiment consists of a successive lowering of trade costs,
starting from a trade-prohibiting level. When trade costs are at the trade-
prohibiting level or higher, the output of each …rm is limited by the size of
the domestic market. For a su¢ciently small domestic market, producing
with the modern technology will not be pro…table, and only …rms with the
traditional technology will be active. As trade costs fall, exports eventually
become pro…table, and the …rms’ market expands. As a consequence, the
pro…tability of modern relative to traditional …rms increases, and eventually
this will trigger entry of modern …rms (and simultanous exit of traditional
ones). As the composition of active …rms changes, the economy experiences
technological change in the sense that traditional …rms become more and
more predominant. Firms with traditional and modern technology may co-
exist for a range of trade costs. However, below some threshold level of trade
costs, all traditional …rms will have exited the market and only modern …rms
will be active.
Figure 2 illustrates the impact of lowering trade costs on the relative
return to skilled labor.10 As can be seen from the …gure, in the interval
of trade costs where there is coexistence of traditional and modern …rms, a
successive lowering of trade costs leads to an increase in the relative return
to skilled labor. Behind this is an increase in the relative demand for skilled
labor as …rms using small amounts of skilled labor exit while …rms using
larger amounts of skilled labor enter.11
{FIGURE 2: The return to skilled labor with the possibility of entry by
two types of …rms}
9The programme performs the necessary checks whether an equilibrium is consistent
with the zero pro…t conditions.
10 In the simulation shown, the following parametrization has been used: S = L = 5:0,
¯ = 0:7, FT = 0:1, FM = 1:0, cT = 0:05, cM = 0:045.
11 In order to address the issue of possible multiplicity of equilibria, we have performed
the simulations changing trade costs in both directions; that is, decreasing as well as
increasing trade costs.
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The increase in the relative return to skilled labor is thus associated
with an increased proportion of skilled labor to unskilled labor in the X-
sector. This is shown in Figure 3, where the e¤ect of changes in t on the
skill-intensity in the X sector is simulated. From this …gure it is clear that
the skill-intensity increases with reduced trade costs in the interval where
there is coexistence of modern and traditional …rms.
{FIGURE 3: Skill-intensity in X-sector}
As trade costs fall below the threshold at which there are only modern
…rms operating, a further lowering of trade costs will induce the existing
…rms to expand their output by drawing unskilled labor from the outside
sector. This increase in the demand for unskilled labor can be seen from
Figure 4. Its negative impact on the relative demand for and relative return
to skilled labor is apparent in Figures 3 and 2, respectively. Figure 4 also
shows the inverted u-shaped relationship between total trade costs and t
referred to above.
{FIGURE 4: Demand for unskilled labor in X-sector}
The main result of our analysis; the relationship between trade-induced
changes in technology on the one hand, and changes in skill-intensity and
relative wages on the other; is robust to alterations in the assumptions
about the factor intensity of trade costs. This relationship exists for the
interval of trade costs in which a reduction in trade costs leads to a change in
the composition of …rms producing with di¤erent technologies. The results
pertaining to trade costs outside this interval, however, are sensitive to such
alterations.
As seen in Figure 3, reduced trade costs entail a decline in the return to
skilled labor whenever there is only one type of …rm active and trade costs
are su¢cently low to induce trade. This is what we would expect given
the relationship between wS and t shown in Figure 1. However, were trade
costs to be incurred in skilled labor only, the relationship between wS and
t in these intervals is less clear-cut. As skilled labor is used to trade goods,
any reduction in t that leads to increased total trade costs will in itself
put upward pressure on wS . Because of the non-monotonic relationship
between t and total trade costs, this may happen for high levels of t. Thus,
a reduction in trade costs may lead to increases in wS in the interval where
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there are only traditional …rms exporting goods.12
A plausible alternative assumption about the factor intensity of trade
costs is that both skilled and unskilled labor are used to trade goods. We
have simulated reductions in trade costs assuming that t is incurred in both
skilled and unskilled labor, using …xed coe¢cients. The results are similar
to the ones shown in Figures 2-4.
4.3 Discussion of the results
We have shown that when we have …rms producing with technologies that
di¤er in their relation between …xed and variable costs, market integration
between identical countries may lead to entry of …rms with relatively large
…xed costs and exit of …rms with relatively large variable costs. On the
assumption that …xed costs are more skill-intensive than variable costs, this
will increase the relative demand for skilled labor and put upward pressure
of the relative return to skilled labor.
There are a number of empirical results that …t in well with such a
story. For instance, Greenaway et al. (1999) examine the e¤ect of both
exports and imports on employment in a large number of manufacturing
industries in the UK. They …nd that increases in both export and import
volumes lead to reductions in derived labor demand, indicating that the
e¤ect may not primarily work through an increased substitution of foreign
for domestic workers in import competing industries. Instead, it appears as if
openness to trade in itself a¤ects the production techniques chosen by …rms,
an interpretation that is consistent with the analysis in this paper. Moreover,
Greenaway et al. (1999) …nd that the employment e¤ects are larger for
trade with other EU countries than for trade with low-wage countries in
Asia. This suggests that the labor market e¤ects of North-North trade may
be more important than the e¤ects of North-South trade. They note that
the stronger impact of EU trade may well re‡ect the fact that most trade
between the UK and other EU countries is intra-industry in nature.
Another empirical study that reports results consistent with our analysis
is Morrison and Siegel (2000), who examine the relationship between trade,
technology, and labor demand using industry-distributed data for the US.
12Counteracting this e¤ect is the increased demand for unskilled labor induced by in-
creased output levels by …rms. However, when the total amount of skilled labor used to
trade goods increases, the number of …rms will decrease since there is less skilled labor
to cover …xed costs. This will dampen the output expansion, not only because there are
fewer …rms producing the same level of output, but also because a market with fewer …rms
will let …rms hold back output levels more.
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They report that technological change has had a greater e¤ect on labor de-
mand than trade, but emphasize that there is a signi…cant indirect impact
from trade. According to their result, trade stimulates computerization,
which in turn enhances the relative demand for skilled labor. They stress
that trade-induced changes in technology are crucial to the full understand-
ing of the impact of trade on the labor market.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper has explored a possible link between increased international com-
petition through trade, technological change and the relative wage of skilled
and unskilled labor. The link focused on is one where improved market ac-
cess provides incentive to switch to a more skill-intensive technology. This
way, we establish a link between trade, technology and relative returns to
skilled and unskilled labor. Moreover, we show that as market integration
continues and trade costs fall below a certain threshold, the e¤ect on the
relative return to skilled labor is reversed and further integration leads to a
lower skill premium.
We believe that the present approach adds to the ongoing debate on the
development of skill premia and skill ratios in the OECD countries. Most
OECD trade is made up by trade between industrialized countries with very
similar relative factor endowments, and a major share of this trade is intra-
industry in nature. Unlike the Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model, the model
presented here allows us to address the link between trade, technology and
wages within a framework that captures exactly these features of the real
world.
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A Appendix
A.1 Market integration without technical change
The relationship between wS and t for situations where there are only …rms
using technology k is found in the following way: The …rst-order conditions
for pro…t maximization imply:
p
µ
1¡ d
k
nk
¶
= ck (24)
p
µ
1¡ (1¡ d
k)
nk
¶
= ck + t (25)
where dk ´ Xkd=(Xkd +Xke ). Dividing (24) by (25) and simplifying yield:
dk =
ck + tnk
2ck + t
(26)
The zero pro…t condition implies:
(p¡ ck ¡ t(1¡ dk))(Xkd +Xke ) = F kwS; (27)
factor-market clearing implies:
nk =
S
F k
; (28)
L = nk(Xkd +X
k
e )
³
ck + t(1¡ dk)
´
+ Y; (29)
and clearing of the market for Y implies:
(1¡ ¯)(L+wSS) = Y (30)
Using (28) in (26) gives:
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dk =
St+ F kck
F k(2ck + t)
(31)
Substitution of (30), (28), and (31) into (29) and solving for wS give:
wS =
¯L
(1¡ ¯)S ¡
¡
2F kck(ck + t) + t2(F k ¡ S)¢
(1¡ ¯)(F k)2(2ck + t) (X
k
d +X
k
e ) (32)
Substituting (26) and (28) into (24) yields the equilibrium price:
p =
S(2ck + t)
2S ¡ F k (33)
Using (33) we …nd that per unit operating pro…ts are:
p¡ ck = St+ F
kck
2S ¡ F k
Using this in (27), substituting for dk and solving for wS, give:
wS =
1
F k
·
St+ F k
(2S ¡ F k) +
(t2(S ¡ F k)¡ F kckt)
F k(2ck + t)
¸
(Xkd +X
k
e ) (34)
By solving (32) for (Xkd + X
k
e ) and substituting into (34) we get an
expression that implicitly de…nes the relationship between wS and t.
A.2 Market integration with technical change
We use the following de…nitions: A variable with superscript f(T ) denotes
the value of the variable in a free trade equilibrium in which there are only
traditional …rms. A variable with superscript a(T ) denotes the value of the
variable in an autarky equilibrium in which there are only traditional …rms.
The pro…t of a modern …rm that enters the market when there are only
traditional …rms operating and free trade prevails is given by:
¼Mf(T ) = (pf(T ) ¡ cM)XMf(T ) ¡wf(T )S FM
The pro…t of a modern …rm that enters the market when there are only
traditional …rms operating and trade costs are trade-prohibitively high is
given by:
¼Ma(T ) = (pa(T ) ¡ cM)XMa(T ) ¡wa(T )S FM
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Proposition 1 ¼Ma(T ) < 0 if the following condition holds:¡
cMFT + (cT ¡ cM)S¢2 < SFTFM(cT )2
(S ¡ FM) :
Proof. ¼Ma(T ) < 0 if (pa(T ) ¡ cM)XMa(T ) < wa(T )S FM : By solving
the model on the assumption that there is no trade we …nd the following
expressions for the endogenous variables in autarky:
w
a(T )
S =
¯LFT
S(S ¡ ¯FT ) ;
pa(T ) =
cTS
S ¡ FT ;
XMa(T ) =
(pa(T ) ¡ cM)
pa(T )
nTa(T )XTa(T );
nTa(T ) =
S ¡ FM
F T
;
XTa(T ) =
¯LFT (S ¡ FT )
cTS(S ¡ ¯FT ) :
By substituting for wa(T )S and X
Ma(T ) in the inequality we …nd that it can
be expressed as:
(pa(T ) ¡ cM)2
pa(T )
nTa(T )XTa(T ) <
¯LFTFM
S(S ¡ ¯FT )
By substituting for nTa(T ) and XTa(T ) and simplifying this can be expressed
as:
(S ¡ FT )(p
a(T ) ¡ cM)2
pa(T )
<
FMcTFT
(S ¡ FM)
Finally, substituting for pa(T ) and simplifying we get:
(cMFT + (cT ¡ cM)S)2 < SF
MFT (cT )2
(S ¡ FM) :
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Proposition 2 ¼Mf(T ) ¸ 0 if the following condition holds:
(cMFT + (cT ¡ cM)2S)2 ¸ 2SF
TFM(cT )2
(S ¡ FM)
Proof. ¼Mf(T ) ¸ 0 if (pf(T ) ¡ cM)XMf(T ) ¸ wf(T )S FM . By solving the
model on the assumption that t = 0 we …nd the following expressions for
the endogenous variables in free trade:
w
f(T )
S =
¯LF T
2S(S ¡ ¯FT ) ;
pf(T ) =
2cTS
2S ¡ FT ;
XMf(T ) =
(pf(T ) ¡ cM)
pf(T )
nTf(T )XTf(T );
nTf(T ) =
S ¡ FM
FT
;
XTf(T ) =
¯LFT (2S ¡ FT )
2cTS(S ¡ ¯F T ) :
By substituting for wf(T )S and X
Mf(T ) into the inequality we …nd that it can
be expressed as:
(pf(T ) ¡ cM)2
pf(T )
nTf(T )XTf(T ) ¸ ¯LF
TFM
2S(S ¡ ¯FT )
By substituting for nTf(T ) and XTf(T ) we get:
(pf(T ) ¡ cM)2
pf(T )
(2S ¡ F T ) ¸ F
TFMcT
(S ¡ FM) ;
which, by substituing for pf(T ) can be expressed as:
(cMFT + (cT ¡ cM)2S)2 ¸ 2SF
TFM(cT )2
(S ¡ FM) :
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Proposition 3 A necessary condition for ¼Ma(T ) < 0 and ¼Mf(T ) ¸ 0 to
hold is 2(cT ¡ cM)2S2 > (FT cT )2:
Proof. According to proposition 1 and 2, in order for ¼Ma(T ) < 0 and
¼Mf(T ) ¸ 0 to hold the following inequality has to be satis…ed:
(cMFT + (cT ¡ cM)2S)2 ¸ 2SF
TFM(cT )2
(S ¡ FM)
> 2
¡
cMFT + (cT ¡ cM)S¢2
This requires that
(cMFT + (cT ¡ cM)2S)2 > 2 ¡cMF T + (cT ¡ cM)S¢2
This expression can also be written as :
(cMFT )2 + 4(cT ¡ cM)2S2 + 4cMFT (cT ¡ cM)S
> 2(cMF T )2 + 2(cT ¡ cM)2S2 + 4cMFT (cT ¡ cM)S
By simplifying this expression we get:
2(cT ¡ cM)2S2 > (cMFT )2:
Proposition 4 FT
¡
cMXM + tXMe
¢
< FM
¡
cTXT + tXTe
¢
if cT ¡ cM >
t
³
XMe
XM
¡ XTe
XT
´
> 0.
Proof. By rearranging FT
¡
cMXM + tXMe
¢
< FM
¡
cTXT + tXTe
¢
we
can express this condition in the following way:
FM
FT
>
¡
cMXM + tXMe
¢
(cTXT + tXTe )
(35)
From (37) follows that
FM
FT
=
(p¡ cM)XM ¡ tXMe
(p¡ cT )XT ¡ tXTe
Substituting for F
M
FT
in (35) and rearranging yields:
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¡
(p¡ cM)XM ¡ tXMe
¢ ¡
cTXT + tXTe
¢
>
¡
cMXM + tXMe
¢ ¡
(p¡ cT )XT ¡ tXTe
¢
;
which can be simpli…ed to
XM
¡
cTXT + tXTe
¢
> XT
¡
cMXM + tXMe
¢
(36)
Dividing both sides of (36) by XMXT and rearringing yield:
¡
cT ¡ cM¢ > t ·XMe
XM
¡ X
T
e
XT
¸
:
Proposition 5 When both modern and traditional …rms co-exist in equi-
librium, the export share of a …rm producing with the modern technology is
at least as large as the export share of a …rm producing with the traditional
technology, i.e., XMe =X
M ¸ XTe =XT .
Proof. In an equilibrium where both modern and traditional …rms co-
exist, pro…ts for both types of …rms are zero. Using the zero-pro…t conditions
for both types of …rms, we get:¡
p¡ cM¢XMd + ¡p¡ cM ¡ t¢XMe
(p¡ cT )XTd + (p¡ cT ¡ t)XTe
=
FM
FT
(37)
Solving the …rst-order condition for pro…t maximization of traditional …rms
in the domestic market for p and substituting into the same condition for
modern …rms yield:
cT
¡
X ¡XMd
¢
= cM
¡
X ¡XTd
¢
(38)
where X ´ nT (XTd +XTe ) + nM(XMd +XMe ). From this expression follows
that XMd > X
T
d (since c
T > cM). Performing the same calculation with
respect to the …rst-order conditions for pro…t maximization in the foreign
market yields:
cT
µ
X ¡
µ
cT + t
cT
¶
XMe
¶
= cM
µ
X ¡
µ
cM + t
cM
¶
XTe
¶
(39)
From this expression follows thatXMe > X
T
e . It also follows thatX
M
e ¡XTe ¸
XMd ¡XTd since c
T+t
cT
· cM+t
cM
. This implies that XMe =X
M ¸ XTe =XT .
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Figure 1: The return to skilled labor with one type of …rm only
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Figure 2: The return to skilled labor with the possibility of entry by two
types of …rms
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Figure 3: Skill-intensity in X-sector
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Figure 4: Demand for unskilled labor in X-sector
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